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ORIGINALISM AND THE PROBLEM
OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
I. THE PROMINENCE OF ORIGINALISM
Originalism is a prominent way of interpreting the Constitution and
of deciding constitutional cases. As we shall see, there are a number of
ways to develop the basic idea of originalism. We can begin with almost
any formulation of the basic idea. Thus the constitutional historian Jack
Rakove suggests, for example, that "advocates of originalism argue that
the meaning of the Constitution (or of its individual clauses) was fixed at
the moment of its adoption, and that the task of interpretation is
accordingly to ascertain that meaning and apply it to the issue at hand."'
For reasons we shall develop, however, originalism rests on fundamental
unfairness, and should in crucial contexts be deemed morally
unacceptable as a basic approach to constitutional decision making.
Originalism is today arguably dominant as a theory, if not in actual
judicial practice. There are certainly dissenters from this belief in
originalism's dominance, including some originalists. Robert Bork, for
example, writing in 1990, argued that "[w]hat was once the dominant
view of constitutional law-that a judge is to apply the Constitution
according to the principles intended by those who ratified the
document-is now very much out of favor among the theorists of the
field.",2 Several years later, Professor Jonathan Macey concluded that
"[o]utside the comfortable confines of the Federalist Society,
originalism is far from fashionable.... As Robert Bork discovered at
his confirmation hearings, those who are originalists lack intellectual
respectability."3
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
The author conveys his thanks to Rachel Anne Scherer.
1. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION xiii (1996) (posing the question of "[w]hat authority should [the
Constitution's] 'original meaning' (or 'original intention' or 'understanding') enjoy in its
ongoing interpretation?").
2. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 143 (1990).
3. Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "Ism," 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 301
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But the intellectual tides have arguably lifted originalism not only to
prominence, but even to dominance. Thus the widely respected
constitutional theorist Michael Perry has declared that "[a]s between the
originalist approach to the interpretation of the constitutional text and
any nonoriginalist approach, the originalist approach is the proper
one."4 Surveying the landscape, Professor Randy Barnett has concluded
that originalism "has thrived like no other approach to interpretation." 5
Even more emphatically, it has been argued that "originalism has
become authoritative, both inside and outside of courts.",6 Similarly, it
has been held that "originalism is the legal profession's orthodox mode
of justification. ,7  And on another assessment, "[o]riginalism has
become the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation."8 Or
even more dramatically, "[t]he only jurisprudence that has made it into
the public sphere is ... originalism."9
In part, this reflects a broadening of the idea of originalism, so that
the title of "originalist" can be more widely adopted." It is thus
suggested that "[w]e are all originalists now."" In at least a broadly
(1996); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 32 (2004)
("[O]riginalism in any form ... holds little attraction for some Justices and many academic
commentators.").
4. Michael J. Perry, Brown, Bolling, & Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner (Among
Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 54 (1995).
5. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 257 (2005) [hereinafter Trumping Precedent]; see also
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 (1999)
("Originalism ... has virtually triumphed over its rivals. Originalism is now the prevailing
approach to constitutional interpretation.").
6. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 550 (2006).
7. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 283, 287 (1996) (quoting noted Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner,
OVERCOMING LAW 245 (1995)).
8. Troy L. Booher, Putting Meaning in Its Place: Originalism and Philosophy of
Language, 25 L. & PHIL. 387, 387 (2006).
9. Keith E. Whittington, Let's Call the Whole Thing Off?, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 365,
365 (2005) (quoting UCLA Law Professor Clyde Spillenger, quoted in Jess Bravin, Change on
the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2005, at A4) (omission in original).
10. See Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952384 ("It certainly seems
like the originalists are winning. Professor Jack Balkin-finding that he couldn't beat 'em-
joined them."); Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism: Original Intent for Liberals (and
for Conservatives and Moderates, Too), SLATE, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.slate.com
/id/2126680.
11. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 65, 67 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment to
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115, 119-21 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997);
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inclusive sense of the term, originalism as a theory indeed seems well-
established, if not utterly dominant.
We will make no attempt to account for the current popularity of
originalism, beyond making one modest point: In matters of authority
and legitimacy, a sense of tradition and continuity have a role to play.
Originalism, in emphasizing reference to the historical document and
the meaning or intentions of famous Framers, can evoke emotional
responses that alternatives to originalism cannot directly match.
In this context, we may think of Walter Bagehot's classic distinction
between the "dignified parts 1 2 and the "efficient parts" 3 of the
institution of the English Constitution. Bagehot thought that the
"dignified" elements of the Constitution tended to "excite and preserve
the reverence of the population," 4 a necessary condition to the exercise
of authority. 5 Our Constitution and the Framers tend to evoke in many
persons something of this reaction.
More recently, the sociologists Edward Shils and Michael Young
developed this theme in noting that the British monarchy had "its roots
in man's beliefs and sentiments about what he regards as sacred."16 As
17Shils and Young argue with regard to the Crown, so, to a degree, for
American constitutionalism. Legitimacy and authority, in a behavioral
sense, are arguably enhanced where criticism is directed not at the
Constitution or the Framers, but against particular court decisions,
particular judges, particular court compositions, or even a particular
court. Recognizing the emotional importance to many of the
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 607 (2004) ("If
'we are all interpretivists' . . . , then we may all also be originalists."); Legal Theory Lexicon,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal-theory-lexicon/2004/O1/legal-theory le 1.html (Jan. 18.
2004) ("These days one is more likely to hear pronouncements that 'we are all originalists,
now."') For some meaningful qualification of this phrase, see Sanford Levinson, The Limited
Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 495, 495 (1996) ("[A]t some suitably abstract level almost everyone is an originalist in
at least some limited sense.") (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311, 313-14 (1996) (discussing an appropriately supplemented "soft" or
generalized originalism as distinct from nonoriginalism)).
12. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 7 (Miles Taylor ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2001) (1867) (emphasis omitted).
13. Id. (emphasis omitted).
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Edward Shils & Michael Young, The Meaning of the Coronation, in EDWARD SHILS,
CENTER AND PERIPHERY: ESSAYS IN MACROSOCIOLOGY 135, 136 (1975) (revised version of
Edward Shils & Michael Young, The Meaning of the Coronation, 1 Soc. REv. 63 (1956)).
17. See id. at 148.
20081
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constitutional text and of the Framers allows us to avoid a narrowly
rationalistic view of legitimacy and authority in practice."8  The
emotional and symbolic dimensions of originalism may thus help
account for its popularity as the adoption of the Constitution recedes in
time.
II. SOME SPECIFIC FORMS OF ORIGINALISM
It is in any event fair to concede the current popularity, if not the
dominance, of originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation.
Before we can evaluate originalism on the merits, though, we should
further'9 clarify the range of meanings of originalism itself.
To some extent, the merits of originalism may depend upon some
much more general theory of interpretation. On the theory of
interpretation of texts in general, however, we shall say little.20 However
18. For diverse warnings against an unduly narrow conception of reason in government
and law, see EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 96-97 (L.G.
Mitchell ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1790); MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF
POLITICS 22-43 (1964); MICHAEL OAKESHOT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS (1962); DAVID
HUME, Of the Original Contract, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 164 (Stuart D. Warner & Donald
W. Livingston eds., 1994) (1748); see also JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE
AND THE CONSTITUTION 76-78 (2004).
19. For our beginning at such an understanding, see supra text accompanying note 1.
20. Meaning, we shall assume for the sake of making progress, is not entirely subjective.
See TERRY EAGLETON, THE MEANING OF LIFE 124 (2007) ("Meaning ... is something
people do; but they do it in dialogue with a determinate world whose laws they did not invent,
and if their meanings are to be valid, they must respect this world's grain and texture."); see
also TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 64 (2d ed. 1996) ("There
is in fact no reason why the author should not have had several mutually contradictory
intentions, or why his intention may not have been somehow self-contradictory ... ").
The noted literary theorist, semiotician, and novelist Umberto Eco has interestingly
opined that
[o]n one side it is assumed that to interpret a text means to find out the
meaning intended by its original author or-in any case-its objective
nature or essence, an essence which, as such, is independent of our
interpretation. On the other side it is assumed that texts can be
interpreted in infinite ways.
Taken as such, these two options are both instances of
epistemological fanaticism.
UMBERTO ECO, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION 24 (1990); see UMBERTO ECO, THE ROLE
OF THE READER: EXPLORATIONS IN THE SEMIOTICS OF TEXTS 15 (1979) (describing "text
[as] a network of different messages depending on different codes and working at different
levels of signification") (emphasis omitted); see also E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS OF
INTERPRETATION (1976); E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 124-25 (1967)
(on law in general and the interpretation thereof). On "meaning" itself, see C.K. OGDEN &
I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 186-87 (1923) (listing a variety of recognizable
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much the Constitution may share with a novel, a poem, a sacred
scripture, a ransom note, a blueprint, a limerick, or a laundry list, there
are other features, perhaps unshared with the above texts, on which we
may profitably concentrate.
Originalism, we have already seen, comes in different strengths and
flavors.2' We can elaborate on our introductory formulation22 by
invoking an exemplary originalist, Professor Raoul Berger. Professor
Berger reported that "I understand by original intention, the
explanation that draftsmen gave of what their words were designed to
accomplish, what their words mean."23
This formulation is controversial in its reference to drafters, rather
than to the ratifiers, of the proposed Constitution.24  At least as
importantly, Professor Berger apparently draws no important
distinctions here among "original intention," "original meaning," and
"original understanding., 25  Of late, some originalists have seen an
important distinction between a more subjective original "intention"
and a more objective or more cultural original "meaning., 26
Cutting across this latter distinction, according to Professor Ronald
meanings of "meaning"). On the meanings of "ambiguity," see WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN
TYPES OF AMBIGUITIES 5-6 (1930). Applying broad literary theory to the Constitution, see
Stanley Fish, Intentional Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A21 ("[Tihe only coherent
answer to the question 'What does the Constitution mean?' is that the Constitution means
what its authors intended it to mean. The alternative answers just don't work: the
Constitution can't mean what the text alone says because there is no text alone; and it can't
mean what present-day society needs and wants it to mean because any meaning arrived at
under that imperative will not be the Constitution's."). Professor Fish's dichotomy, however,
may not be exhaustive, as Ogden and Richards seem to suggest. OGDEN & RICHARDS, supra,
at 195 ("[W]e very often mean what we do not mean; i.e., we refer to what we do not intend
21. See Levinson, supra note 11, at 495-96; Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 312
(1996).
22. See supra text accompanying note 1.
23. Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 350, 350-51 (1988).
24. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 143 (referring specifically to "those who ratified the
document"); Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 5, at 620.
25. See Johnathan G. O'Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 Nw.
U. L. REV. 253, 255 (2001). Whether genuinely consistent with his originalism or not,
Professor Berger also disdained any appeal to natural rights or natural law in constitutional
interpretation. See id. at 255-56.
26. See, e.g., Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 5, at 620 (citing
Robert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia, among others); Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra
note 5, at 257 (discussing "original intentions" versus emphasis on "original public meaning of
the text").
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Dworkin, is a further distinction between "'semantic' originalism, 27
which focuses on what was intended to be said 28 and "'expectation'
originalism,"2 9 which focuses on the expected consequences of the
language in practice.3' It goes without saying, for example, that we
sometimes fail to grasp all of the meaning and practical implications of
our own language."
This is not to suggest that all forms of originalism must focus
narrowly on something like "meaning." It is suggested, for example,
that even some originalists may want to consider "principles of political
morality, prudence, doctrine, [and] rule of law considerations, '3 2 in a
subordinate way, in seeking constitutional meaning. At the very least,
originalists of the public-meaning variety will typically want to have
access not only to (historic) dictionaries, but to the conventions of
ordinary English communication, 3' and to the canons and conventions of
legal meaning35 as well. Originalists, finally, may also "acknowledge that
the original understanding of some clauses could be fairly read to have
included a background assumption of further judicial development.""
All of these considerations add to the difficultly of reducing all forms
of originalism to a concise slogan, but they also enrich originalism and
add to the resources available to originalists in responding to some
traditional criticisms37 of originalism.
27. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 119; see also Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's
"Originalism": The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 204
(2000).
28. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 119.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. There is, for example, nothing in the public, semantic meaning of "the equal
protection of the laws" that confines its application either to a particular race or to race in
general, whatever anyone's expectations may have been in adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment.
32. Leib, supra note 10; see also Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 9), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954601 (endorsing recourse to
"underlying principles," but only for the sake of properly applying "the original meaning of
the text interpreted in light of these principles" to present circumstances).
33. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 519
(2003).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 519-20.
36. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 38.
37. For brief listings of some standard criticisms of originalism, see ROBERT A. DAHL,
How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 2-4 (2001); Thomas E. Baker,
Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 57, 74 (2004); Randy E.
Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 8
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III. ORIGINALISM AND HISTORICAL TAINTEDNESS
The developments sketched above allow for a variety of forms of
originalism. But such developments cannot avoid crucial problems that
inhere in any authentic version of originalism. Originalism is
inescapably and crucially tainted as a normative theory. This essential
taintedness will admittedly not be evident in the context of many
constitutional questions. But there are, as well, matters of fundamental
importance to constitutional jurisprudence where the taintedness of
originalist theory is crucially relevant and ineradicable. The historical
circumstances on which any standard38 of originalism relies are
themselves tainted in such a way as to disqualify originalism as a
primary method of constitutional interpretation in vital legal contexts.
The taintedness of the history on which originalism relies is well
known. In adopting the Constitution, the actual majority of American
adults constituted "a majority that never was."3 9 We all recognize that
"a majority of adults-women, non-whites, and some white males-...
were excluded from active participation in making [the] laws, whether
directly or through their elected representatives. 40 With regard to the
Constitution and its adoption, "[t]he majority of the population-
women, slaves, free blacks, persons without substantial property-had
no voice in ordaining the Constitution."" In the aggregate, "[tihe
Constitution received far from overwhelming consent even from those
who participated or were eligible to participate, much less from the
(2006).
38. This qualification is meant to address two closely related possibilities. First, any
theory can be so diluted, or so extensively incorporate crucial elements of rival theories, that
only the name, rather than the substance, of the original theory remains. To the extent that
an originalist is willing to dilute, if not abandon, what is distinctive about originalism, the
originalist may fare better with critics, but at the cost of conceding the substance of the
debate.
Second, and as a particular instance of the first, one could, technically, adopt an
ahistorical, merely hypothetical form of originalism, focusing on idealized circumstances,
events, and agreements. This approach could minimize what we refer to as the problem of
tainted history. But it would be originalism in only a nominal sense. In substance, such a
merely hypothetical originalism might more closely resemble the development by John Rawls
of hypothetical agreements from his original position, transferred to a constitutional context.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Whatever the merits of such a theory, it
would not most usefully be classified as a form of genuine originalism.
39. Jack N. Rakove, Book Review, 14 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 184, 184 (1983) (reviewing
and quoting JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 383 (1982)).
40. Robert A. Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United
States, 92 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 5 (1977).
41. Louis Henkin, The United States Constitution as Social Compact, 131 PROC. AM.
PHIL. SOC'Y 261, 263 (1987).
2008]
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eighty percent of the population that was ineligible. '" 42
Our focus is not on details or on bare percentages. Our focus is
instead on the intended virtual exclusion from any meaningful role in
the constitutional adoption process of significant identified groups with
basic interests at stake.4'3 This systematic virtual exclusion was intended
to have particular results and, in any event, has systematically skewed
constitutional law over time.
Of course, most of the excluded groups were at various later points
incorporated into the electoral process. But by then, the basic nature
and substance of the Constitution had been established. A late
enfranchisement does not undo history. The ripples on the pond
continue to radiate outward. A powerful bias, if not a realistic
irreversibility, still obtains. A judicial precedent is only the most formal
manifestation of this developing bias. American constitutional history,
and our present constitutional law, are, as we shall briefly suggest, what
is called "path-dependent.""4 These exclusions, the systematic skewing
and the path-dependency, jointly raise serious questions of
constitutional legitimacy in important contexts.
In this light, we must recognize originalism as relying on and
maintaining, rather than solving, the problem of constitutional
legitimacy. Originalism is actually part of the problem. We can make
progress on the problem of constitutional legitimacy not by adhering to
originalism, but only by adopting some alternative that better addresses
the systematically exclusionary history crucial to constitutional
originalism."
Consider specifically that while specific franchise rules varied from
colony to colony, generally, "'the people' included only those adult
42. Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1498 (1985); see also id. at 1498 n.44
("[R]oughly 2.5% of the population voted in favor in the Constitution's ratification."); Alex
Kozinski & Harry Susman, Original Mean[der]ings, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1590 n.55 (1997)
(citing Simon, supra).
43. While we will not press too closely into details of legitimacy, we should also not
attach undue significance to the influence, for example, of even particular women such as
Mercy Otis Warren, who after all was an Anti-Federalist. See generally LINDA K. KERBER,
WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 80-
85 (1980).
44. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. The popular idea of the "butterfly
effect" in changing the weather over time is a more extreme case. See infra note 185.
45. Many of the problems of negotiation, bargaining strength, strategy, super-
majoritarianism, and priorities are common to most approaches to constitutional
interpretation.
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males who possessed certain amounts and kinds of property. ' '46 In some
colonies, perhaps a £50.00 freehold of twenty-five to one hundred acres
would suffice.47 These and similar limitations were clearly intended to
reduce the potential scope of the franchise in important and systematic
ways.
The various racial, gender, and property-holding or class status
limitations supposedly aimed at reducing electoral irresponsibility.4 But
irresponsibility here quickly loses its status as a neutral criterion, and
instead suggests bias and important conflicts in vision and interest.
In particular, it was assumed by the well-off that those with little
property, lacking independence of means, 9 would lack also a meaningful
stake in society' and would therefore tend toward electoral
irresponsibility. 1 More specifically, it was feared, those without an
economic stake in society would be drawn toward economic "leveling"
and redistribution .
Differences along these lines cannot be neutrally resolved by
labeling ideological opponents as too irresponsible to vote. Given this
and other forms of systematic exclusion from the drafting and ratifying
of the Constitution, it is not surprising that the Constitution became "an
aristocratic document designed to curb the democratic excesses of the
Revolution."53 Nor is it surprising that the Framers anticipated that the
composition of Congress would largely mirror the general franchise
requirements. 4
46. FORREST MCDONALD, NOvUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 25 (1985).
47. See id. at 26.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. One might imagine that the greater a person's economic dependence on
others, whether for charitable alms or modest wages, the greater their stake in the society's
economic productivity and security. Perhaps those with the greatest wealth would also tend
to have the greatest independence, including international mobility. But our point is not to
critique the Framers' theory of the franchise, constitutional or otherwise.
51. See id.
52. See id. See also the underlying conflict of visions in the poll tax case of Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (rejecting wealth, property, or ability to
pay as a legitimate limitation on the franchise).
53. See Shlomo Slonim, Motives at Philadelphia, 1787: Gordon Wood's Neo-Beardian
Thesis Reexamined, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 527, 528 (1998) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 626 (1969)).
54. See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism
and Originalism?, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2394 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER,
ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)) (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
2008]
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Our point does not address any differences in interests or voting
patterns among substantial property owners.5 We instead focus on the
general exclusion of free and enslaved blacks, women, and those white
males falling below some specified property minimum. These sorts of
exclusions would of course be morally objectionable in themselves, even
if the exclusions had no effect on the text and development of the
Constitution itself. The moral bindingness, legitimacy, and authority of
the Constitution, at least in certain crucial respects, could on this basis
alone be called into question.
But it is also important to think through possible consequences of
these exclusions for constitutional law, as enshrined in the text and in
the resulting interpretive case law. It is impossible to reconstruct with
certainty what would have happened constitutionally given a much more
inclusive group of constitutional drafters and ratifiers. Even if we
assume that one purpose of the exclusions was to discourage
"irresponsible" 56 redistribution, we have nevertheless thereby opened
the door to the idea that the influence of the excluded groups would
have made some generally predictable difference, along economic lines.
If the systematically excluded had enjoyed some meaningful say in
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, they perhaps would
have attended to their most basic interests, including their most basic
economic and survival interests. This is not to guess at the bargaining
strength that the already economically disadvantaged would have been
able to exercise. 7 But any coercion or duress by the relatively well-off
in the course of articulating and bargaining over constitutional
provisions could certainly impeach the moral legitimacy of any resulting
constitution. 8
55. Compare the debate over Charles Beard's particularized economic analysis of the
Constitution, as referred to in, for example, Shlomo Slonim, supra note 53, at 527, with
FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
349 (1958), Neil K. Komesar, Paths of Influence-Beard Revisited, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
124, 124-25 (1987), and Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51-52 (1987) (addressing CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913)).
56. See MCDONALD, supra note 46, at 26.
57. For general theoretical discussion, see, for example, JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE
LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975); DAVID GAUTHIER,
MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
TRADITION (1986); CONTRACTARIANISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID
GAUTHIER'S MORALS BY AGREEMENT (Peter Vallentyne ed., 1991). For a much more
heavily qualified contractarianism, see RAWLS, supra note 38.
58. For the voidability even under positive law of contracts obtained through economic
duress, coercion, or overreaching, see, for example, Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d
[91:687
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It is also possible that no constitution inattentive to the basic
economic and survival interests of the excluded would have been
ratified by a more inclusive group of ratifiers. And there is no reason to
suppose that if the disenfranchised had been allowed free and equal
scope for participation, they would have ignored their basic interests
across the board, focusing entirely on less crucial matters.
59
Even today we see significant differences on basic economic and
welfare policy along lines paralleling the group exclusions from the
constitutional adoption process. Merely for example, the frequently
encountered "gender gap"' on social welfare policy61 has been widely
discussed.62  Significant racial differences on employment and welfare
policy are also well established.63 Much of the logic of these policy
differences, as in the case of enslaved and freed blacks, would seem to
translate to the historical circumstances of both the constitutional
founding and the ratification of the Civil War Amendments.6'
It seems clear that the constitutional adoption process was
dramatically skewed to promote not just the neutral quality and
503, 511 (2007) (citing Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nev. Nat'l Bank, 270 U.S. 438, 444 (1926); Int'l
Underwater Contractors v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1979)).
59. While a constitution at the national level must provide for structural matters where
the resolution can be arbitrary within limits, as in the specified ages of elected officials, we
may assume that the excluded groups would have noticed their own relevant basic interests,
whatever their degree of altruism, as much as did those actually enfranchised. The Tenth
Federalist Paper focuses on group interest as a political motivator. See THE FEDERALIST No.
10 (James Madison). Much of this general logic seems to be shared by the majority and the
minority in the later poll tax case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
60. See, e.g., Kristi Andersen, The Gender Gap and Experiences with the Welfare State,
32 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 17, 17 (1999).
61. See id.
62. See id. (citing, e.g., THE POLITICS OF THE GENDER GAP: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE (Carol M. Mueller ed., 1987)). For a recent
popular argument for a direct causal relationship between the extension of women's suffrage
and the expansion of federal government social welfare spending as a percentage of the
economy, see JOHN R. LoTT, JR., FREEDOMNOMICS: WHY THE FREE MARKET WORKS AND
OTHER HALF-BAKED THEORIES DON'T 160-65 (2007). For further detail, see Robert Y.
Shapiro & Harpreet Mahajan, Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of
Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 42, 44-45, 51 (1986).
63. See, e.g., ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 178-79 (1980);
WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN VOTER 368-69 (1996).
This is not to suggest that the effects of race and economic class are easily disentangled. See
ROBERT C. SMITH & RICHARD SELTZER, RACE, CLASS, AND CULTURE (1992).
64. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION 89 (2005); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
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integrity of the process, but particular group interests and preferences as
well. This impeaches the supposed neutrality and fairness of the
adoption process and the adopted Constitution. Since originalism as a
theory of constitutional interpretation relies especially heavily on this
systematically skewed, exclusionary process, originalism inherits the
taintedness of the underlying history.
IV. DOES TIME DISPEL THE HISTORICAL TAINT?
Is the taintedness of history that is inherited by originalism washed
out, however, by the possibility of later constitutional amendment or
even by ordinary statute? All of the originally excluded groups referred
to above have by now been granted the power to vote. Does the
possibility of new constitutional amendments and statutes undo the
objectionable history upon which originalism distinctively relies?
This argument is made by the originalist Robert Bork in the
following terms:
The dead, and unrepresentative, men who enacted our
Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments did not
thereby forbid us, the living, to add new freedoms. We
remain entirely free to create all the additional freedoms
we want by constitutional amendment or by simple
legislation .. 65
The argument thus seems to be that whatever fundamental illegitimacies
may have tainted the original Constitution can be readily neutralized,
and thereby remedied.
Professor Bork's analysis, however, understates the realistic
difficulties involved in obtaining majority recognition for minority
rights. It is doubtless impossible to tell what precise constitutional text,
if any, would have resulted from an inclusive constitutional ratification
process that required fair bargaining and some form of supermajority
for adoption.66 It is also impossible to tell whether today's amendment
processes are more or less demanding in one sense or another than the
65. BORK, supra note 2, at 171.
66. For discussion of the original ratification requirements, see, for example, JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 105-09 (reprint
ed., 1987) (nine state convention votes required for ratification pursuant to U.S. CONST. art.
VII).
67. For several amendment routes, all requiring supermajorities at more than one stage,
see U.S. CONST. art. V. For a broad theoretical discussion, see RESPONDING TO
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original ratification vote.
What Professor Bork's analysis most underemphasizes, however, is
the combination of the difficulty at any point of obtaining supermajority
support for legitimate minority interests, along with the rather delicate
"path-dependency" of American constitutional history. If there were
indeed a miraculous "reset" button controlling the nature and scope of
recognized constitutional rights, persistent minorities of various kinds
would be generally last to have access to that reset button.
More importantly, though, there simply is no such reset button.
American constitutional history cannot be readily erased and re-run.
Some events can be atoned for, but not readily undone, with their
effects then somehow rapidly and entirely dissipated. Some events,
including basic injustices, have consequences that tend to persist, and to
directly, indirectly, and even unrecognizedly influence the future.
In general, the Constitution as adopted, with no influence from the
excluded groups, becomes the baseline. Any amendments from that
baseline require multiple supermajorities.68 The Constitution, even
insofar as it can be said to be morally tainted, gradually accrues
additional sociological legitimacy in the sense of unchallenged status
and in terms of cultural symbolism.69 Thus it is said that "the drafting,
ratification, and amendment of the 1787-89 Constitution continue to be
seen as events that express the will of a properly empowered American
'people' to set and define the character and limits of the polity."7° At a
more personalized level, "[tlhe constitutional Founders still seem to
enjoy a regard, if not reverence, that has not significantly diminished
over time.",
71
Despite Professor Bork's suggestions, a minority that seeks to even
partially redress basic injustices through a constitutional amendment or
statute that redistributes power or wealth faces at best a steep uphill
climb, rather than level ground. These circumstances speak to the moral
legitimacy of the Constitution, at least for substantial numbers of
persons in crucial respects.
We can use the idea of "path dependence" to refer to part of the
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995).
68. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
69. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
70. Richard S. Kay, "Originalist" Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 335, 337 (1996).
71. Id. Consider also the continuing tide of popular biographies of the various Founders
and Framers.
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problem with Professor Bork's argument. In a non-technical sense, the
idea of path dependence recognizes that while, say, each coin toss in a
series may be independent of the others, our political and legal future
may, in contrast, be crucially limited if not realistically dictated by
previous political and legal decisions of varying degrees of justice.7 The
familiar judicial doctrine of stare decisis or respect for precedent73 is
only one element of this process.
From the perspective of those disadvantaged at the time of drafting
the Constitution, even their later enfranchisement does not mean that
they are now restored or "back on track," in the sense of being as well
positioned in substantive constitutional rights and influence as they
would have been had they been allowed to appropriately influence the
constitutional process from the beginning. Some of the effects of the
original exclusions can to a degree become "locked in. 7 4 The scope of
rights recognized today and tomorrow may well indirectly reflect in
traceable and untraceable ways past procedural and substantive
exclusions. To put the matter another way, "what might do best today
could have been selected out for extinction in the past."75 Justice today
may have been precluded by the continuing, if always shifting,
influences of decisions and power relationships as they existed in the
past.
Can we still hear today any echoes in our constitutional law of the
original systematic exclusion of particular groups? Below, we will
72. For discussion of the various uses of the term "path dependence" in the social
sciences, see Stephen E. Margolis & S.J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 17-22 (1998); Paul Pierson,
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251,
251 (2000) (With a path dependent phenomenon, "particular courses of action, once
introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse."). For a brief survey of some interesting
purported applications, see Stan Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Policy and Path
Dependence: From QWERTY to Windows 95, 18 REGULATION, Summer 1995, at 33,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl8n3d.html. See also S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205
(1995); James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC'Y 507
(2000).
73. For discussion, see, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (O'Connor, J., for the plurality); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 570 (2001); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
74. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001) ("[C]ourts' early
resolutions of legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change.").
75. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641,
641 (1996).
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briefly consider as an example the Supreme Court's judicial treatment of
a claim to any sort of constitutional right to minimal housing.76 In a time
in which some advocates on all points of the political spectrum advocate
for one right or another not expressly referred to in the constitutional
text,77 there has been surprisingly little interest in endorsing the idea of
even minimal economic constitutional rights for the poor and
disadvantaged. It is often at just such economic or survival claims that a
theorist draws the line between his or her own political preferences and
what the theorist is also willing to claim that the Constitution requires.
It is sometimes claimed that for many non-originalists, there is a
remarkable correspondence between their own independent policy
preferences and what they take the Constitution to require.8 In
response, a number of non-originalist theorists have pointed to
important differences between their own policy preferences and what
the Constitution can reasonably be said to mandate.
Thus, Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf, for example,
write that "[i]f we were writing a Constitution ... , we might well favor
... a constitutional provision setting a ceiling on the intergenerational
transmission of wealth .... But ... it is quite impossible to read our
Constitution as including [such a provision]."79 Professor Cass Sunstein
similarly endorses President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's vision of
economic security or basic welfare rights as a matter of a vital public
commitment, but specifically not as a matter of a judicially enforceable
constitutional right.'
Most elaborately, consider the distinction drawn by Professor
Ronald Dworkin:
If I were trying to answer the question of what equal
76. See infra Part VII.
77. See, e.g., the rights of privacy, intimacy, or autonomy recognized in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), or the various liberty rights referred to in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
78. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 7, at 287-91.
79. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 16
(1991).
80. See Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt's
Second Bill of Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205, 215 (2005). For Professor
Sunstein's positive or historical account of related matters, see Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does
the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1,
23-24 (2005) (noting also that the two most recent Democratic nominees to the Supreme
Court, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, "seem uninterested in aggressive judicial protection of
social and economic guarantees").
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citizenship means as a philosophical exercise,.... I would
insist that citizens are not treated as equals by their
political community unless that community guarantees
them at least a decent minimum standard of housing,
nutrition and medical care. But if the Supreme Court
were suddenly to adopt that view, and to announce that
states have a constitutional duty to provide universal
health care, it would have made a legal mistake, because
it would be attempting to graft into our constitutional
system something that (in my view) doesn't fit at all.8
Each of these theorists thus sets aside even the most vital and least
costly claims to economic provision from the realm of enforceable
constitutional law. This line is drawn regardless of any consideration of
fault, desperation, public affordability, and ease or difficulty of eligibility
determination and enforcement. We know that this exclusion of any
economic subsistence element from the Constitution, including the
later-adopted Civil War amendments, is in some sense personally
undesired by the theorists cited above. We can responsibly speculate,
however, that many of those persons who were excluded from direct
influence on the Founders' Constitution, or on the Civil War
amendments, would have been sympathetic to some culturally
appropriate minimal floor of economic provision as a matter of last
resort."
Today's leading non-originalists would no doubt uphold the equal
protection interests of groups such as of women, even though women
were not generally enfranchised when the equal protection language of
the Fourteenth Amendment was being drafted and adopted.83
Economic or survival rights are another matter. But those who are
reluctant to read the Constitution to include minimal economic rights
today might well hold otherwise if all the originally systematically
81. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1254 (1997); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 36 (1996) (rejecting "a
degree of economic equality as a constitutional right"); Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin's The
Moral Reading of the Constitution: A Critique, 72 IND. L.J. 1099, 1109 (1997) (recognizing the
above limitation).
82. We might begin the backward extrapolation from the historical and chronological
data available in the materials referred to supra notes 60-63. By analogy, consider the scope
and limits of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine that often excludes evidence based on
causally related "tainted" police activity at an earlier time. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586, 591-92 (2006).
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (adopted 1920).
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excluded groups had exercised fair initial influence on the constitutional
text and case law. The constitutional text and case law that the
influence of excluded groups might have generated could well have
tipped the balance toward a Constitution interpreted to protect at least
some minimal economic subsistence rights."'
V. LEGITIMACY, CONTINUING EFFECTS OF PAST INJUSTICE, AND
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
How, then, does the drafting, ratification, and adjudicated history of
the Constitution, given the group exclusions we have noted, affect the
claims to universally morally binding authority and legitimacy of the
Constitution? In particular, we will want to consider whether methods
of interpreting the Constitution and adjudicating constitutional cases
make a significant difference on matters of moral legitimacy. Our focus
will be on whether constitutional originalism compounds the problems
of legitimacy, where some alternative approach to constitutional
interpretation tends to mitigate such problems.
It is important to recognize, to begin with, that there is a vital
difference between the sociological legitimacy of the Constitution85 and
the moral or morally binding legitimacy of the Constitution.86 These two
senses are not entirely separate, in that a Constitution that is unknown
or universally ignored, and thus sociologically illegitimate, is likely to
not be genuinely morally binding as well. But we will argue that a
Constitution can be legitimate in the former sociological sense yet not
legitimate in the latter, and for our purposes more important, moral
sense.
Let us merely assume that the current Constitution, in itself 7 and as
authoritatively interpreted, carries the former sort of sociological or
behavioral compliance legitimacy. Thus, rightly or wrongly, most legal
84. For an intriguing take on the purported absence of economic subsistence rights from
the Constitution, see Robin West, Constitutional Fidelity and Democratic Legitimacy (July
2007), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Robin%2OWest%20Vanderbilt%2OPaper
%207-2007.pdf. Classically, see Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659.
85. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1789-90 (2005).
86. See id.
87. For a sense of how this might operate, see supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
For a classic source emphasizing legitimacy in the sociological compliance sense, see Seymour
Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SC. REV. 69 (1959). For further social science investigation of
related issues, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
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actors and ordinary citizens take the Constitution to be legitimate,
authoritative, and binding, on the basis of anything from unthinking
acceptance to prolonged reflection. It is accordingly said to be a "legal
tradition in the United States"' that "government officials and citizens
are obligated to abide by the regime of legal rules that govern their
conduct."8 9 If it is a slight overstatement to say that "this nation has
always treated the Constitution as law," 9 opposition to the Constitution
itself, as distinct from particular interpretations thereof, receded in the
period after 1800 and again after the Civil War.91
If we move the focus to moral, rather than sociological or
compliance, legitimacy, we begin to step beyond purely empirical claims.
Consider, for example, the still largely sociological claim that "the
drafting, ratification, and amendment of the 1787-89 Constitution
continue to be seen as events that express the will of a properly
empowered American 'people' to set and define the character and limits
of the polity."' This may, we assume, be descriptively accurate. But the
popular beliefs referred to may or may not be normatively well-justified.
Persons may be more or less mistaken in believing in the moral
legitimacy of a constitutional regime.
For originalists, the legitimacy of the constitutional founding process
and the resulting constitutional text are crucial to their claims.93 Thus
Professor Bork argues that "only the approach of original understanding
meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must
meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy. Only that approach is
consonant with the design of the American Republic." 94
Now, there may well be a sociological sense in which the original
Constitution, as amended and as interpreted in some originalist way, is
commonly treated as legitimate. But if we are to take originalism as
properly interpreting a genuinely morally binding Constitution, some
persuasive argument must be offered. And it is not obvious why a
88. Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 469,469 (2007).
89. Id.
90. BORK, supra note 2, at 174.
91. See Dahl, supra note 40, at 2.
92. Kay, supra note 70, at 337; see also Leib, supra note 10 ("Many people would have
no trouble with originalist mechanics because they take for granted that the document is
binding.").
93. See BeVier, supra note 7, at 286 ("Originalists tend to ground their arguments
primarily on a foundation of legitimacy.").
94. BORK, supra note 2, at 143.
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constitutional ratification process that was deliberately so remarkably
narrow in demographic and class terms95 should be thought of today as
"democratic."%
Despite any sociological legitimacy of the original Constitution, the
question of the moral legitimacy of that Constitution remains. It would
be morally irresponsible for any conscientious citizen, including those
who decide constitutional issues, to casually assume the universal moral
bindingness of the Constitution. We need not endorse the mainstream
current school of thought, known as "philosophical anarchism," that
denies a general moral obligation to obey the law simply as law.97 It may
be that some constitutions and laws are legitimate and morally binding,
even universally, but that others are not. The question is one of where
our own Constitution falls. To the extent that our Constitution has been
or remains tainted by any illegitimacy, originalist methods that validate
such illegitimacy are equally morally objectionable.
We have throughout our discussion above noticed the undemocratic
exclusions from constitutional influence,98 and their general continuing
influence. 99 These considerations form much of the foundation of a
critique of originalism, but the argument can certainly be more fully
developed on both sides. It is thus sometimes suggested that originalism
allows the constitutional judge some perspective, some independent
criteria, or some distancing from his or her own ideological
preconceptions. Originalism is thus said to provide "ground to debate
hard questions at some remove from our personal political and moral
95. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
96. BORK, supra note 2, at 143.
97. For sophisticated work along these lines, see HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 62-
94 (1999); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 192-95
(1979); ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970); David Lyons, Moral
Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1998); M.B.E.
Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950, 951-52 (1973).
For commentary, see R. GEORGE WRIGHT, LEGAL AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION: CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 275-81 (1992).
98. See supra Part III. It should be noted that in referring to the various constitutional
exclusions as undemocratic, unjust, or morally unjustified, we do not mean to judge the
Framers in their time and place, or to compare the constitutional franchise with the franchise
in other late eighteenth century governments. Instead, it is we, including today's originalists,
who must decide whether the broad constitutional exclusions are morally objectionable, in
the sense of relevantly "tainting" the fairness and legitimacy of the constitutional adoption
and subsequent history, including case law development. What was politically viable or
realistic two hundred years ago is relevant only insofar as it may bear upon what we now take
fair inclusion to require.
99. See supra Part IV.
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preferences. '"10 More ambitiously, it is claimed that "in principle the
textualist-originalist approach supplies an objective basis for judgment
that does not merely reflect the judge's own ideological stance." 101
We shall briefly address some potential limits on non-originalist
decision making below."° More directly relevant, we can concede that in
at least some respects, the original Constitution provides sufficiently
unambiguous language to give the originalist useful guidance. °3 For our
purposes, the major problem is not the ambiguities of the Constitution,
but almost the opposite. It is entirely clear that the drafting and
ratification was essentially unaffected by major economic and
demographic groups whose rights were nonetheless thereby determined.
This is a matter of crucially skewed exclusions rather than of
exclusions skewed on some merely insignificant basis. If the process had
begun with broad inclusiveness, then excluding even eighty percent" of
that broad group, with the exclusions being made randomly, would not
have been as morally objectionable as the actual process. Even
systematic exclusions would not have been so bad if those exclusions
had been made along lines that do not track significant political and
economic interests and divisions.
Thus systematically excluding, say, all those born before 6:00 p.m. on
any given day, however objectionable for other reasons, would not have
reinforced and worsened a major political or economic conflict. The
interests of those born before and after 6:00 p.m. tend to be parallel.
The interests of slave owners and enslaved, property owners and
propertyless, free whites and free blacks, and such may overlap in
varying respects. But such a congruence of interests cannot be counted
on in all important contexts. History records few expressions by white
males to the effect that they need not be allowed to vote, as long as the
vote of free black males exists to speak for them and uphold their
shared interests.105
100. Leib, supra note 10.
101. McConnell, supra note 54, at 2415 (emphasis omitted).
102. See infra Part VII.
103. Thus we set aside ambiguities associated with terms such as commerce, due process,
privileges and immunities, the freedom of speech, cruel and unusual punishment, the Ninth
Amendment, and the equal protection of the laws. For some relatively early interpretations,
see STORY, supra note 66, at 134-62. For some complications, see AMAR, supra note 64;
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 231-83
(1998).
104. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
105. Those actually enfranchised might argue that those left disenfranchised would tend
to vote redundantly or else irresponsibly. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. But
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The problem, in a nutshell, is not that the Constitution offers no
determinate guidance to a judge beyond the judge's own moral and legal
reflections. The main problem is instead that, in certain important
contexts, to ground one's decision in the constitutional text and
subsequent history is to ground one's decision in evident fundamental
unfairness, carried forward in a path-dependent way.'°6 Consider a
simple analogy. The value of a road sign is not in its longevity or its
publicness and visibility alone. A familiar road sign that we can see as
pointing in the wrong direction should not be followed. In our key
contexts, originalism asks us to follow road signs pointing in an
acknowledged wrong direction.
Some have argued that the Constitution should generally be
followed because enactment of the Constitution required
"supermajorities," and the need to obtain a supermajority for various
reasons tends to lead to better textual outcomes or better consequences
than does pure majoritarianism, whether among voters or among
Supreme Court Justices.'O°  But constitutional supermajoritarianism
should be placed in the context of the estimate that perhaps 2.5% of the
population voted in favor of ratification." Even so, we can stipulate to
the general logic of supermajority requirements producing better
results, even for permanent minorities."l The problem, in our context,
begins with the crucial systematic exclusion from the electorate of
various important demographics and classes."'
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, the primary exponents of
constitutional supermajoritarianism as yielding better consequences
over time, recognize that, in their words, "the desirability of
supermajority rules requires that all interests be reflected in the
electorate.'.. They recognize that the exclusion of African-Americans
in particular, among other groups, 2  was a violation of this
there is a problem of suppressed symmetry at work here. We can imagine that enslaved
persons, free blacks, and propertyless whites might, if given the chance, have argued in
contrast that the votes of the privileged classes would tend, disproportionately, to be morally
irresponsible on key issues.
106. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
107. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of
Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383,385-87 (2007).
108. See supra note 42.
109. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 107, at 385-88.
110. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 41, at 263.
111. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 107, at 395.
112. See id. at 394-95.
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requirement,"3 and may well have rendered the Constitution as a whole
non-binding on African-Americans. 4
At this point, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport respond,
ambiguously, that "these defects in the Constitution have been
corrected""1 5 through the Civil War Amendments and the 1965 Voting
Rights Act.11 6 They recognize possible complications.1 17 But with these
and analogous constitutional amendments in place, the defects of the
founding process are thought to have been thereby "eliminated...
This, however, will not do.
Let us consider an analogy. Suppose an open bottle of wine had
been tipped over for a time, with wine slowly spilling out of the bottle
until, some time ago, the bottle was righted, ending further spilling.
Whether we want to say that righting the bottle, even some time ago,
has "corrected"' ' 9 the problem depends on what we take the problem to
be. Righting the bottle, and leaving it upright for years, does not clean
up the mess. It does not restore the initial conditions, or the conditions
of a continuously upright bottle. The staining effect of the spilled wine
remains.
Or to sharpen the issues of fairness and alternative histories a bit,
consider possible sports analogies. A golfer who is forced to tee off an
hour after an opponent may not be at any real disadvantage if both must
simply play the same course under no time constraint. Even a later
starting marathoner may be at no real disadvantage if given credit for
the late start. But a two-hour delay where the goal is to catch more bass
by the shared deadline of noon is, in contrast, a severe handicap.
Letting the delayed competitor merely do some fishing, with a two-hour
handicap, leads to a different history and perhaps a different outcome
than otherwise would have occurred.
A closer, if both fanciful and invidious, analogy could involve two
marathoners, where one marathoner, from the very start of the race, is
required to run with ropes tied about the ankles. At roughly the
midpoint of the race, it is decided that fairness and equality require that
the thus-bound runner be freed, and the bound runner's ropes are at
113. See id. at 395.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., id. at 396 n.55.
118. Id. at 395.
119. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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that point removed. After a substantial period of attempting to run in
the ropes, the runner's form and efficiency suffer, naturally, for a time.
And the runner in question is, due to the handicap of the ropes for half
the race, well behind.
Should we be willing to say that removing the ropes halfway through
the race has "corrected" the problem? Perhaps the effects dissipate
only gradually over time, if at all. Does the history of the race while the
ropes were in place quickly dissipate, or does that history radiate
forward? Does what has unfairly happened not threaten to in various
ways significantly affect what will happen, even long after the bonds are
loosed?
In the constitutional context, we may today have well-established
skeptical thoughts about, say, any federal constitutional right to minimal
shelter. Certainly, no such minimal federal constitutional right has been
recognized."' Many of us may feel quite certain about the matter. But
if the enslaved, free blacks, women, and the propertyless and near-
propertyless had been allowed a free and equal opportunity to fairly
negotiate and vote on the text of the original Constitution, and to
exercise ordinary political influence indirectly affecting how the
Constitution is read today, constitutional common sense today might
well be different. Such an alternative history of the Constitution, and of
its later originalist jurisprudence, 2' might differ in areas affecting the
survival interests of the descendents of those originally excluded from
influence.
None of this is to suggest that federal constitutional survival rights,
as they might earlier have been envisioned by their supporters and
perhaps reluctantly agreed to by others, for the sake of ratifying the
Constitution as a whole, would have been akin to twenty-first century
welfare state programs. Instead, the minimal survival rights language
appropriate for the late eighteenth century could have come from a
variety of classic and contemporary sources.2 1 Such ideas seem marginal
120. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
121. It is certainly possible that if our constitutional drafting and ratification had been
much more inclusive, originalism as a normative theory would be even more popular across
the political spectrum, even with its need for supplementation remaining.
122. We may fairly assume that some original provision for minimal survival rights could
have been agreed to, even by supermajority, if the rights were sufficiently minimal and thus
not so expensive as to significantly reduce overall welfare, and many of those sympathetic to
such rights made their approval of the Constitution contingent upon some such provision.
123. For rationales for variously enforceable basic welfare rights, one might cite
THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS II-II, question 66,
art. 7 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 2d rev. ed. 1920); CONDORCET,
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in the context of the Framers only because we, like the Framers, assume
away nearly all those persons whose interests would place a relatively
high priority on such rights.
The idea of enforceable welfare rights was not unknown or
anachronistic at the end of the eighteenth century. It was, however,
relatively important mainly to those excluded from the constitutional
process.24 Minimal welfare rights could realistically have been adopted
without undue burdens on the well-off, and without undermining future
economic development. So the originalist cannot claim that the only
realistic choices for an inclusive electorate in the late eighteenth century
would have been either a constitution without any minimal welfare
rights, or no new federal constitution at all.125
Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, in SELECTED WRITINGS
209, 279-81 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976) (1793); THOMAS PAINE, Agrarian Justice, in
THE THOMAS PAINE READER 471 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987) (1795). Most
significantly, though, see John Locke's reference to the natural obligation, prior to and in
political society, to affirmatively and not merely negatively attend to the minimal well-being
of others, as in JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 6, at 6 (Gateway
1955) (1690) ("Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself,.., by the like reason, when his
own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest
of mankind .... ). Consider also the Kantian "imperfect" moral duty of promoting the
welfare or happiness, given our limited means, of other persons, in light of the pressingness of
their needs. See, e.g., H.J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT'S
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 172-73 (1948); ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL
THEORY 208 (1989). More politically, see IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS, 101, 202-03 (Mary Gregor trans., 1996) (1797) ("[Tlhe government is therefore
authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to those who are
unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs."). Kant could not be clearer
that he is not talking merely about voluntary charity or merely moral obligations; the
obligation owed by the well off to their fellow citizens is to be discharged by one form or
another of coercive taxation. See id. at 101-02. For an earlier discussion, see BENEDIC'r DE
SPINOZA, The Ethics, A SPINOZA READER: THE ETHICS AND OTHER WORKS 85,241 (Edwin
Curley trans., 1994) (1677) ("[T]he care of the poor falls upon society as a whole, and
concerns only the general advantage.").
124. This is again not to argue that the Constitution would have been substantially
different, across the board, if the Constitution's text had been drafted and agreed to by a
broader range of society, including but not limited to the historical participants. That might
well be, but it is not what we need to claim herein. Perhaps negotiations would have broken
down. The more inclusive alternative constitution might have failed supermajority
ratification. Our argument goes mainly to the moral illegitimacy of the important
demographic and class exclusions and to originalism's reliance on and validation and
furtherance of that process.
125. Our argument herein is not that individual state constitutions throughout American
history could not have themselves guaranteed a right to minimal welfare or housing. Indeed,
states and localities might in some respects have seemed the more natural places to turn in
the Founding Era. Our argument is merely that if states did not more or less universally write
such guarantees into their own constitutions, a new federal constitution could have been
envisioned as a guarantor of last resort. And it is fair to say that the historical track record of
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING AS
MORAL DECISION MAKING
Originalism in its standard forms is thus vulnerable to the objection
that it validates morally defective drafting and ratification arrangements
and the ensuing path-dependent legal culture and case law. Broader
theories of constitutional legitimacy that emphasize some form of
genuine consent or free agreement to be bound by the Constitution are
of no help to originalists in this context. We do not validly bind persons
to a contract by excluding them from any participation, in the absence of
their unequivocal, knowing, and free consent at any point. 6 Nor can
the assumed higher quality of supermajority constitutional ratification'
legitimize the systematic group exclusions to which we have referred.
Originalists might gain some ground, however, by supplementing
their originalism in the right way. It may not be plausible to argue that
the group exclusions eventually paid off for even the excluded groups
themselves. Randy Barnett, however, raises the possibility of
legitimizing a constitution through determining whether that
constitution, interpreted in light of its original meanings,"" creates a
system of lawmaking 9 that is "good enough,"' 3 ° and that allows only for
"necessary and proper""' lawmaking, and more specifically, for laws
that among other things "do not violate the background . . . 'natural'
rights"'32 of those persons required to follow the constitution.
This is promising in a general sense, but it is certainly hard to see the
group exclusions as a necessary element of a system of lawmaking that
respects the "background . . . 'natural' rights" of those excluded. 4 For
the directly affected groups, it would be far easier to argue that the
drafting and ratification process, as well as the Constitution itself in
the states in constitutionally guaranteeing such rights has been mixed at best. For a sample of
some relatively recent litigation, see R. George Wright, Homelessness and the Missing
Constitutional Dimension of Fraternity, 42 LOUISVILLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
126. See Barnett, An Originalist for Nonoriginalists, supra note 5, at 636-37; Henkin,
supra note 41, at 263; HUME, supra note 18; see also R. GEORGE WRIGHT, REASON AND
OBLIGATION: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO LAW AND POLITICAL MORALITY 19-35
(1994).
127. See supra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
128. See Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 5, at 642-43.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 643.
131. See id. at 639, 642.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 639.
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crucial respects, along with the rigorous amendment processes,'35
violated, rather than respected, the assumed natural rights at stake.
The idea of natural rights in general, 136 as well as the articulation and
defense of particular natural rights,'37 will of course be controversial, as
will the theory's application in context. But natural rights theory,
whatever weight it attaches to original intent, could be said to be on the
right track. In fact, there is a sense in which a much more generalized
such approach literally must be on the right track. Let us briefly
consider how.
We have seen that a judge ought not be impressed by originalist
theories of constitutional interpretation as applied to matters affecting
the most basic practical interests of the major excluded groups. But this
conclusion prompts further questions. If a judge faces, say, a claim of
some minimal welfare rights, to what extent, if any, should the judge
give weight to originalist methods, or to established case precedents
perhaps based on originalism? Should a judge in such a case take a
guess at what a fair and democratic constitutional adoption process
could have set in motion, down an alternative historical track? As well,
the judge has taken an oath to uphold the actual Constitution,"38 and not
some shadow constitution, or no constitution at all. What weight should
an oath be given? How should these and related questions be
answered?
In a way, the answer is easy. The judge is faced with a moral
decision, in the sense that some possible decisions and rationales may be
somehow morally better than others. The judge's decision making is
thus within the zone of coverage of the moral. This means, on a
common understanding, that the judge's decision must be morally
satisfactory, even if not precisely the morally right or best decision.
Typically, for the judge, considerations of morality are in a sense
ultimate or overriding.139 Even some possible exceptions, as when a
135. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
136. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175
(1955); RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
(1979).
137. See Hart, supra note 136 (discussing a natural equal right to liberty); RANDY E.
BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 53-61
(2004).
138. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. More specifically, see 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) and 28
U.S.C. § 453 (2000), the net effect of which requires the federal judge to, among other things,
"do equal right to the poor and to the rich," 28 U.S.C. § 453.
139. See, e.g., ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 1 (1978) (moral requirements
not overridable in the core sense of the term "morality"); R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND
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judge decides that the overall morally best decision must be set aside on,
say, religious or aesthetic grounds, may depend upon an unduly narrow
idea of morality, or be otherwise publicly unacceptable. 0
Generally, a judge deciding a constitutional case and a legislator
deciding a constitutional matter should choose only from among the
morally acceptable outcomes and rationales. Morality binds legislators
deciding constitutional matters as much as judges. We note this here
only because it is sometimes claimed that an advantage of originalism is
its superior capacity to justify judicial review.' We take no position on
judicial review, or on the alleged superiority of originalism in this
respect. We refer below to judges simply for the sake of convenience.
Our logic would apply equally to legislators, Presidents, or anyone else
making a constitutional decision.' 2
REASON 168-69 (1963) (a sense in which morality is overriding); Kenneth Einar Himma,
Substance and Method in Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, 88 VA. L. REV. 1119,
1166 n.125 (2002) (citing leading philosopher William K. Frankena, The Concept of Morality,
63 J. PHIL. 688 (1966)) ("It is usually thought, as a conceptual matter, that moral obligations
override all other obligations."). Perhaps most pointedly, see D.Z. Phillips, Do Moral
Considerations Override Others?, 29 PHIL. Q. 247, 247 (1979) ("[O]ne distinguishing mark of
moral considerations is that if a person cares for them, he cannot ... say that they should be
overridden by considerations of any other kind.").
140. Someone might object to water pollution mostly on aesthetic grounds, perhaps, but
most, if not all, of what is objected to in such cases can be reasonably taken up under a broad
conception of morality.
141. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 479, 485 (1996) ("Nothing beats originalism in court, because nothing else is capable of
supporting a judicial veto."); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 854 (1989) (non-originalism as incompatible with the logic of judicial review). For a
recent defense of judicial review, see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
For recent critiques of strong or traditional judicial review, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 249-53
(2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154-76
(1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346
(2006).
The claim that only originalism can justify judicial review seems doubtful. Originalists
may prefer broad popular majority rule today, but they do little to compensate for the
suppression of broad majority rule at the time of the founding. Whether the Constitution, as
inherited, can be better interpreted, particularly with regard to the rights of unpopular
groups, by elected legislators or by more insulated federal judges is open to debate. Again,
we need not take sides on these issues herein.
142. Originalist theorists can, certainly, make important contributions to the overall
theory of originalism without raising any questions of morality, in the sense of the moral
merits or demerits of originalism. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal
Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48, 53-54 (2006) (focusing on a hypothetical reasonable
American as of 1788 as the touchstone for interpreting the text of the Constitution even
today, but explicitly setting aside the question of any moral defense, legitimacy, or morally
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This does not mean that there will always be some single
objectively' 3 best and clearly evident'" outcome and rationale in any
particular case. Further, judges are not required by morality to pretend
that they possess boundless powers of moral imagination, empathy, and
calculation.' Judges may, where appropriate, rely on simple moral
rules. 46  As well, the idea of morality itself is neutral as among
emphasizing moral rules, consequences, or virtues and vices.'47
Considerations of natural right,148 natural law,' 9 or something like utility,
wealth maximization, or pragmatic payoffs5° may or may not play a part.
A judge who is properly guided by morality may, at least to some
degree, consider not just the judicial oath,' but the judicial context,
including the judge's place in a vertical hierarchy, deference and comity,
and the weight of judicial precedent. More broadly, context can be
morally relevant, including the more or less legitimate expectations of
other persons. Role morality'52 may thus be relevant. Awareness of the
judge's own limits, fallibilities, and biases of various sorts,"' including
what is called confirmation bias, may all play a role in judicial decision
binding authority of the Constitution).
143. For some skeptical arguments regarding aspirations to moral objectivity or moral
realism in the constitutional context, see Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1279, 1287 (2007).
144. See id.
145. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-82 (1977).
146. See HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (1995).
147. For a concise but authoritative introduction to Kantianism, utilitarianism, and
virtue theory, see MARCIA W. BARON ET AL., THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE
(1997).
148. See BARNETr, supra note 137, at 53-86.
149. See, e.g., DAVID BRAYBROOKE, NATURAL LAW MODERNIZED (2001); Douglas
W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism for the Twenty-First Century-A Principle of Judicial
Restraint, Not Invention, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 383, 400-01 (2007); Michael S. Moore,
Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087
(2001).
150. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 57-96
(2003).
151. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L.
REV. 853 (1992).
153. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 141, at 863 ("It is very difficult for a person to discern a
difference between those political values that he personally thinks most important, and those
political values that are 'fundamental to our society.'").
154. For a concise summary, see Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) (on the
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making.
None of this, of course, is very specific or definitive, because, by
itself, the idea of morality as overriding leaves open many possibilities.
While judges deciding constitutional cases are bound by morality's
requirements, this does not make judicial decision making, as a species
of the former, any easier. Morality in general does not tell us how to
specifically apply itself."'
A requirement of thinking in terms of following the dictates of
morality, however, is not without real practical value in our context.
Consider a judge who is asked to decide some question of a possible
constitutional right to, let us say, some minimal shelter, sufficient to
sustain life otherwise vulnerable to the elements. Now, we need not
attempt to answer this constitutional and moral question."' Nor need
we settle upon some specific method of reaching a morally defensible
result in such a case."' Our focus is instead more modestly on
originalism and on fundamental fairness. We need only ask about the
degree, if any, to which a judge should, in order to reach a morally
sound result and rationale in such a minimal shelter case, rely on any
originalist theory.
Whatever the virtues of originalism elsewhere, originalism seems
poorly adapted to generate a morally defensible result and rationale in
this minimal shelter case and any similar cases. Relying on originalism
in this context, given our constitutional history, would ratify the morally
indefensible group exclusions and their later effects to which we have
referred throughout. Consider Professor Randy Barnett's question:
"[W]hat about the majority of inhabitants who were not permitted to
vote for any [Constitutional Convention] delegate?""1 8  Professor
Barnett observes that "[t]hough voting requirements varied with local
jurisdictions, in no place could women, children, indentured servants, or
slaves vote. Moreover, it was not uncommon to have a property
requirement that limited the voting rights of white males and free black
"seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs").
155. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text; see also Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1102-03 (1989) (noting
the uncertainties of method and result in modern moral philosophy); Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 39-40 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
156. For discussion, see Wright, supra note 125.
157. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
158. BARNETT, supra note 137, at 20.
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males."5 9
If we quite reasonably assume that the excluded groups would tend,
out of sympathy if not direct interest, to care somewhat more about
shelter and survival than would those with established property
interests, originalism would lead us off in a morally unjustified direction
in deciding such a case. In this sort of case, originalism validates and
extends the practical effects of what even originalists recognize as
indefensible on any plausible moral theory.' 6°  In our contexts,
originalism relies on what virtually any mainstream moral theory would
recognize as fundamental unfairness, worked forward over time.
Can an originalist make progress, though, by compromising
originalism? Justice Scalia, for one, has referred to himself as only a
"faint-hearted' 161 originalist. The problem in Justice Scalia's case,
however, is that his departures from originalism do not match up well
with the problem of fundamental unfairness we have outlined above.
Justice Scalia seems willing to depart from originalism if solidly
entrenched case-precedent, and thus stare decisis, stand in the way of an
originalist result, 62 or if circumstances have changed so that an
originalist result would be plainly impractical or unrealistic.163
But the problem in our fundamental unfairness cases, and in the
minimal shelter right context in particular, is not one of a choice
between originalism and any entrenched pro-housing right case
precedent. Unsurprisingly, the most widely cited case in that general
context, Lindsey v. Normet,'6 apparently rejects any such constitutional
right claim.16 And the Lindsey case itself shows that in the modern era,
Justice Scalia need not concern himself with whether denying minimal
shelter rights at the constitutional level is somehow unrealistic or simply
159. Id.
160. It is of course technically possible to try to defend the major group exclusions on
grounds of natural right, natural law, pragmatism, Kantianism, utilitarianism, virtue theory, or
any other approach to morality. But the originalist would have to show that such exclusions,
and their consequences for law and culture carried forward in some path-dependent way,
deserve to be defended on the moral merits. Yet the anti-democratic nature, basic
inegalitarianism, and fundamental unfairness of doing so pose substantial obstacles to such an
attempt.
161. Scalia, supra note 141, at 861-64.
162. See id.
163. See id. For further discussion, see Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1755 & n.42 (2007).
164. 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
165. See id. at 74.
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impractical.' 66
The more basic problem for compromise versions of originalism is
that to be moved by considerations of fundamental unfairness in the
constitutional adoption process does more than merely supplement, or
even create an exception from, constitutional originalism. This is
because a broad and central departure from fundamental fairness is
inescapably central to originalism. The fundamentally unfair group
exclusion problem does not merely call for compromise with
originalism, but crucially undermines the moral logic of originalism.
There are admittedly many areas of constitutional law where the
original exclusions either were not originally significant, beyond the
inherent and profound group insult, or where later developments may
well have dissipated any initial adverse effects, as far as we can tell. The
Constitution has from the beginning, for example, prohibited the
granting of titles of nobility.167 On the assumptions immediately above,'
16
there is no further direct moral harm in interpreting this and similar
constitutional provisions through some form of originalism.
Our argument is thus not that originalism too often merely reaches a
legally or morally objectionable result, or that the method of originalism
is indeterminate or subjective and open to manipulation. Instead, we
have argued that especially in matters of basic practical interest to those
historically excluded from the ratification process, the exclusions
amounted to fundamental unfairness. This procedural 69 unfairness
typically continues to radiate in some fashion across time, even with the
adoption of the Civil War and other amendments. Originalism in such
crucial cases thus validates, relies on, and is inseparable from
fundamental unfairness.
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
168. It might be possible to tell a story about how the excluded groups might actually
have benefited from a protective sense of noblesse-oblige felt by American nobles. For the
sake of the argument, we assume instead that few if any members of the excluded groups
would have been elevated to the nobility themselves, or would otherwise have benefited from
a hereditary aristocracy.
169. We have emphasized the procedural injustice in excluding a number of significant
groups from the creation of the Constitution and of constitutional law. Originalism, in relying
on this procedural injustice, is thus procedurally undemocratic. It is thus misleading to
suggest that originalism relies on fair representation and majority rule, and is thus
procedurally democratic, while also being substantively undemocratic, or undemocratic in
some more advanced sense. This unnecessary concession is made in Samuel Freeman,
Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5
(1992).
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VII. CONCLUSION
With originalism largely disqualified on moral grounds, we are
initially left with the vague requirement that constitutional decision
makers must reach some morally permissible outcome in some morally
permissible way.170 The question of which of the various alternatives to
originalism, alone or in combination,' l7 best meets this underlying moral
requirement is well beyond our scope. Our focus has been on
orginalism.
Merely for the sake of suggestion, though, let us briefly consider
what we might call a highly idealized offshoot of originalism, as
articulated by the early constitutional theorist, Justice Joseph Story.
Story wrote that
a constitution of government, founded by the people for
themselves and their posterity, and for objects of the
most momentous nature, for perpetual union, for the
establishment of justice, for the general welfare, and for
a perpetuation of the blessings of liberty, necessarily
requires, that every interpretation of its powers should
have a constant reference to these objects.' 1
This amounts to what we might call a "basic purpose" or
purposivism approach to constitutional interpretation. Crucially,
though, we should take the references to democracy and justice in a full,
modern, inclusive sense. And then we must apply this modernized
democratic purposivism to not only federal governmental powers, but to
the scope and even the nature of constitutional rights as well. Once we
reject the various broad group exclusions at our original founding,
however, we clearly have something other than originalism.
Consider, though, this basic purposivism in the context, say, of a
claimed minimal right to shelter. The closest the Supreme Court has
come to such an issue is, again, the case of Lindsey v. Normet,
73
addressing the merits of a state's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer
170. For discussion, see supra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
171. Interdependence among the various major approaches to constitutional
interpretation is a continuing theme in R. George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy Among
Constitutional Theories, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141 (2004).
172. STORY, supra note 66, at 141.
173. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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Statute. '74 In rejecting the tenants' assertion that greater than mere
rational basis equal protection scrutiny should apply, ' the Court
declared that
[w]e do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We
are unable to perceive in that document any
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a
particular quality .... 176
The Court here seeks to draw a clear distinction between what may
be practically important, or even vital, to some, and what is
constitutionally protected.'77 The Court apparently views involuntarily
homeless persons' deaths from exposure as for constitutional purposes
within a broad category of all social and economic ills.' General social
rudeness, or declining vocabularies, might presumably also count as less
acute social ills similarly not subject to constitutional remedy. The
Court notes79 that at some point, lines of constitutional compliance
regarding a minimal shelter right would have to be drawn,' 8' as would
also be true of various sorts of recognized rights.
Most important for our purposes, though, is the Court's failure to
consider how constitutional history, including recent constitutional
history, might well have been different if the process of drafting and
ratifying the Constitution had been more inclusive, fairer, and more
democratic.1 8 1 We can easily imagine that for the typical constitutional
drafter, avoiding having troops quartered in his home during time of
174. See id. at 58-60.
175. See id. at 73-74.
176. Id. at 74. For contemporaneous discussion, see Gerald Gunther, Foreword. In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1972).
177. See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73-74.
178. See id. at 74.
179. See id.
180. Any minimal housing right would generate borderline cases, but homeless persons
would, presumably, be typically better off with access to even a borderline facility. It should
be noted that the Court does not abandon the idea of, say, implied substantive due process
privacy rights because it finds the constitutional borderline in such cases to be shifting or
unclear. Compare the contrasting methodologies and results of Justices Scalia and Brennan
in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-32, 136-57 (1989).
181. Recall our clarifications supra note 98.
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peace" was indeed a higher realistic priority and more to be provided
against than was the risk of involuntary homelessness. We can also
easily imagine that many of the systematically excluded groups,
including those not meeting property-ownership requirements, 83 would,
if asked, have ranked sheer survival and avoiding homelessness as a
higher priority, whether we think of such groups as especially risk averse
or not.'8
What precisely the excluded groups would have asked for, or would
have had the voting leverage to extract, cannot possibly be known. Nor
do we know how the Civil War Amendments might have been phrased
or interpreted-still assuming both a ratified Constitution and a Civil
War-if the constitutional adoption process had been more democratic.
It is often suggested that the gentle flapping of a butterfly's wings in
South America could eventually result in a tornado in the Northern
Hemisphere."" We need not go so far as to claim that a slight difference
in the initial context would by now have led to a dramatically different
judicial Constitution. But we should bear in mind that what from our
current perspective would have been a minimally fair expansion of the
electorate at the Founding would have been far more dramatic than any
number of butterfly wing-flappings.
It would be implausible to argue in response that a dramatic
expansion of the Founding franchise would have been politically
infeasible, and yet that the effects of an expanded franchise on
constitutional history would have been only minimal. If a fairly chosen
electorate had, perhaps by some miracle, been made eligible, it is
difficult to believe that this would have led to no systematic differences
in the constitutional argumentation of their and our day.
The excluded groups would, like other groups, have held some range
of views, expressing some mixture of public-spiritedness and group
182. As duly enacted into our fundamental law, U.S. CONST. amend. III.
183. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of risk aversion, see Sven Ove Hansson, Risk, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., Mar. 2007, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk. The philosopher
John Rawls seeks to build what actually amounts to risk aversion in basic matters into his
original position contractors' reasoning, while denying that they are to think of themselves as
risk averse. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 137, 176-77.
185. This "butterfly effect" has been described as "sensitive dependence on initial
conditions," such that only a slight difference in initial conditions becomes exponentially
amplified over even a short period of time, leading to dramatically different futures. The
Butterfly Effect, http://www.cmp.caltech.edu/-mcc/chaosnew/Lorenz.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2008) (for a visual display, click the start button).
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interest.1" No group would have been unanimous as to how to promote
the group's interests or on their attitudes toward risky personal
outcomes over the course of one's life. Few would have imagined what
a right to shelter might have involved centuries later, in a rich and
technologically advanced society. But basic self-interest and sympathy
might well have inspired many among the excluded groups to place
some sort of culturally appropriate emergency or last-resort housing
right on the agenda for discussion."' A similar logic would apply as well
to various other potential constitutional rights-claims associated with
survival, basic subsistence, basic opportunities, and perhaps to the
meaning of privileges and immunities of citizens,'" the Ninth
Amendment,'89 and eventually the Equal Protection Clause."9 On each
of these matters, then, constitutional originalism unfortunately grounds
itself, as we have seen, in irredeemable historic illegitimacy. 9'
186. In this sense conforming to the predicted pattern of the famous Tenth Federalist
Paper. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton).
187. This is not to deny any of the differences between real property prices, incomes, the
nature of housing, and cultural expectations then and now. Presumably any of the familiar
"positive" constitutional rights claims, as to subsistence, education, or healthcare, would have
changed importantly in their meaning over two hundred years.
188. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
189. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
191. The idea of any sort of "positive" constitutional right, apart from a right to
appointed criminal counsel, or to more ambitious interpretations of the Equal Protection
Clause, may seem unnatural, unfamiliar, and ahistorical today. See, e.g., DeShaney v.
Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 195-97 (1989); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 30-36 (1973) (narrow 5-4 decision). But these are natural responses to our
constitutional history in its most directly tainted and fundamentally unfair respects. It is
simply not plausible to claim, for example, that the educational spending case of Rodriguez
could not have been decided 5-4 the other way if our constitutional founding and subsequent
history had been much more democratic.
* * *
